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Summary findings
Much of the substantial literature on banking crises  The authors find that contemporary banking crises are
focuses on early warning indicators. Demirgiiu-Kunt,  not accompanied by declines in aggregate bank deposits,
Detragiache, and Gupta look at what happens to the  and credit does not fall relative to output,  but the growth
economy and the banking sector after a banking crisis  of both deposits and credit does slow down substantially.
breaks out.  Output recovery begins the second year after the crisis
Much of the theory of banking crises assigns a central  and is not led by a resumption of credit growth. Instead,
role to depositor runs.,  with vulnerability to runs viewed  banks (including the stronger banks) reallocate their asset
as a basic characteristic of banks as financial  portfolio away from loans.
intermediaries. But banking systems can be financially  This suggests that protecting deposits during a banking
distressed even when dlepositors  do not withdraw their  crisis may not be enough to protect bank credit, as lack
deposits, if other bank creditors rush for the exit or if  of usable collateral and poor borrower creditworthiness
banks become insolvent.  discourage banks from lending. However, protecting
Are contemporary banking crises characterized by  bank credit may not be a priority right after a crisis, as
large declines in deposits?  the real economy can rebound without it, at least while
there is substantial underused capacity.
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I.  Introduction
With  the proliferation  of banking  problems  around  the world,  in the last few years  the
empirical  literature  on systemic  banking  crises  has grown substantially.  This literature  has
mostly  focussed  on the factors  associated  with the onset  of distress,  to identify  the determinants
of the crises  or to look for "early warning  indicators"  of trouble.' In this paper, we shift
attention  to what happens  to the economy  and to the banking  sector after a banking crisis  breaks
out. The evidence  comes from both macroeconomic  and bank level data. The macroeconomic
sample  includes 32 banking crises  over the period 1980-1995,  while the bank-level  data covers
16 crisis  episodes  during 1991-98.
While  our main goal is to characterize  the "stylized  facts" of the post-crisis  period,  the
analysis  of the empirical  evidence  is centered  on a few key issues: first, much of the theory of
banking  crises  assigns  a central  role to depositor  runs,  and vulnerability  to runs is viewed  as a
basic characteristics  of banks as financial  intermediaries. 2 However,  systemic  banking  crises  in
which  large segments  of the banking  system  become  financially  distressed  may occur even
when depositors  do not withdraw  their deposits,  if it is other  bank creditors  who "rush for the
exit", or if banks simply  become  insolvent. So the first question  that we take up is whether
contemporary  banking crises  are characterized  by large  declines  in deposits.
I Among  the first studies are Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1998 and 1999),  Eichengreen
and Rose (1998),  and Hardy  and Pazarbasioglu  (1999); among  the second,  see Kaminsky  and
Reinhart  (1999)  and Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Detragiache  (2000).
2 For theoretical  models  of bank runs see, among  others,  Diamond  and Dybvig (1981),  Chari
and Jaganathan  (1988), and Allen and Gale (1998). For a review  of the literature,  see
Bhattacharya  and Thakor  (1988).-3-
The recent banking crises in Mexico and East Asia were accompanied by a strong but
short-lived downturn in output;  in both cases, the speed of the recovery has been attributed to
the expansionary effects of the sharp real exchange rate depreciation associated with the crisis. 3
The second question that we examine is whether this pattern is typical of banking crises in
general, or if it is a special feature of these recent cases. This is an important question in
designing post-crisis macroeconomic policies.  A third issue is to what extent the behavior of
output is driven by that of aggregate bank credit.  If the crisis forces banks to cut lending, and if
the resulting "credit crunch" is important in the propagation of the crisis, then restoring the flow
of credit should be a priority for policy-makers in the immediate aftermath of banking crises. 4
We also examine whether the need to support a weak banking system leads monetary authorities
to pursue expansionary monetary policies that fuel inflation and, possibly, exchange rate
depreciation.  Finally, we will consider the effects of banking crises on government budgets
since, as documented by Caprio and Kliengebiel (1996), a number of recent banking crises
resulted in expensive government bailouts. 5
In the second part of the paper we study how the profitability, capitalization, liquidity,
asset and liability structure, and cost-efficiency of banks change following a systemic crisis
using bank-level data.  If depositor runs are the major cause of banking crises, we expect to see
3 On Mexico, see for instance Krueger and Tornell (1999). On the Asian crises see IMF (1999).
4 Bernanke (1983) argued that the contraction in credit brought about by the banking crisis was
instrumental in the propagation of the Great Depression in the U.S..  Recent attempts to test for
a credit crunch effect in East Asia include Ding, Domac, and Ferri (1998), Ghosh and Ghosh
(1999), and Borensztein and Lee (2000).
S Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1998) argue that prospective government deficits arising
from bank bailout costs caused the 1997 East Asian currency crises.- 4 -
deposits  decline  both in absolute  terms and as a share  of bank assets. Also, under  the credit
crunch  hypothesis  bank loans should  decline,  while  the ratio of loans  to assets should  increase,
as banks attempt  to maintain  funding  levels for their customers.
To identify  the stylized  facts of the post-crisis  period,  we test whether  the variable  of
interest in each  of the years  immediately  following  a crisis is significantly  different  from the
mean of the pre-crisis  period.  Thus, the exercise  provides  information  as to which  variables
appear  to be significantly  affected  by the occurrence  of the crisis, but also as to how the
response  changes  while the crisis  unfolds. Besides  looking  at average  behavior,  we also try to
identify  differences  in "aftermath  behavior"  among  groups  of countries  and of banks.
The paper is organized  as follows: the next section  discusses  sample  selection  and
methodology. The evidence  from the aggregate  data is in Section  III. Section  IV discusses
foreign  exchange  valuation  effects,  while Section  V presents  the analysis  of bank level  data.
Section  VI concludes.
IL  Sample Selection and Methodology
A.  The Sample
We define a banking crisis as a period in which significant segments of the banking
system become illiquid or insolvent.  To identify systemic crisis episodes, we look at evidence
of large scale bank failures, at the enactment of emergency measures by the govermunent
(deposit freezes, nationalizations, deposit guarantees, bank recapitalization plans), at whether
there were reports of significant depositor runs, at the level of non-performing loans (at the peak
of the crisis), and at the costs of the bailout. The baseline sample for the present study includes
36 banking crises in 35 countries (see Appendix I for a list of countries and dates). For each- 5 -
variable of interest, a panel of observations is formed by pooling the 36 time series consisting of
the three years before the crisis, the crisis year, and the three years following a crisis.  For some
variables, the panel may exclude one or more countries because of lack of data or because of
outliers.
B. A regression framework to identify stylized facts
To assess whether the behavior of the variables of interest changes following a banking
crisis compared to the pre-crisis period, we examine whether in the crisis year and in each of the
three aftermath periods the variable in question took on values significantly different from the
average of the three years preceding the crisis.  To this end, we estimate OLS regressions in
which each variable is regressed on four time dummies, one for the year of the crisis, and one
each for the three periods following the crisis.  To control for heterogeneity across countries, we
also introduce country dummy variables in the regression.  More formally, let N denote the
number of countries, and let yit be an observation for variable y in period t and country i.
Furthermore, let u,, be a disturbance term,  let y and /  be regression coefficients, and define as
T the year of the crisis. Then, in the empirical model we estimate:
y,, = Y  +Uj,
for t-T-1,  T-2, and T-3 and i=l,  ..., N, and
Y., = Yj + 8, +uj,
for t= T, T+l,  T+2, and T+3 and i=l,  ..., N.  In this framework, the OLS estimate of each beta
(the coefficient of the period t dummy) is the mean difference between the value of the variable
at t and the mean of the pre-crisis period.  Thus, if the estimated betas are significantly different- 6 -
from zero, then the variable  behaves  differently  in the post-crisis  period  than in the pre-crisis
years. Furthermore,  comparing  the coefficients  of the time dummies  with one another allows  us
to trace the dynamic  evolution  of the variable  over the post-crisis  period. Because  of
heterogeneity  across  countries,  we use heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors to do
hypothesis  testing.
II. Evidence  from Aggregate  Data
A. The Behavior  of Bank  Deposits
The rate of growth in demand  deposits  falls significantly  relative  to the pre-crisis  period
in the crisis  year, but by the following  year the difference  is no longer significant  (Table 1).
Furthermore,  deposits as a share  of output do not decline  significantly; in fact, the sign  of the
coefficient  is positive,  although  not significant  except  in the third year after the crisis. Total
deposits,  which include time and foreign  currency  deposits,  are larger than in the pre-crisis
period,  but this may reflect in part the revaluation  of foreign  currency  deposits  in countries
where a large currency  depreciation  accompanied  the banking  crisis,  an issue that is examined
in more  detail in Section  IV below.  Of course,  some banks  may experience  runs and lose
deposits,  but these deposits  may be reinvested  elsewhere  in the banking  system,  so banks do not
lose demand  deposits  in the aggregate. 6 Also, runs may  be short-lived,  and not be captured  in
annual data, as was the case of Argentina  in 1995.
6Aggregate  deposits  did not decline  during  the recent Asian crises, while depositors  switched
from small  to large banks and from domestic  to foreign  banks (Domac  and Ferri, 1999,
Lindgren  et al., 1999). The Asian crises  are not included  in our macro sample.- 7 -
These findings  suggest  that, in contrast  with the historical  experience  which has inspired
much of the theoretical  literature,  depositor  panics  have not been a major element  of
contemporary  banking  crises. But why is it that depositors  do not run in the presence  of
widespread  insolvency  in the banking  system? There are two possible,  and not mutually
exclusive,  explanations: one is that even in the most dire crises  there remains  a segment of the
banking  system  that is perceived  to be safe, and depositors  flee there rather than to cash.
Another  hypothesis  is that depositors  in many of the sample  countries  were protected  through  a
generous  safety  net, including  explicit deposit  insurance,  "lender  of last resort" facilities,  ex
post guarantees  of deposits,  and prompt  government  rescues  of troubled  institutions.
D. Output,  Investment,  and Bank Credit
The banking  crisis is accompanied  by a sharp decline  in output growth,  of the order of
four percentage  points (Table 1). Growth  remains depressed  in the year following  the crisis, but
returns  to its pre-crisis  level thereafter.  The ratio of investment  to GDP is below  its pre-crisis
level in all the periods,  but significantly  so only in T+1. Thus, while financial  distress  wreaks
havoc in the banking  system and it often  takes many years  to clear up the mess, the effects on
the real economy  seem  to be short-lived. This is consistent  with the observed  "U-shaped"
output recovery  following  the Mexican  1995 crisis  and the 1997  Asian crises.
The observed  decline  in output and investment  growth  may be as much the consequence
of the adverse  shocks  that contributed  to the banking  crisis as the effect  of the crisis itself.
Disentangling  causality  in this context is an impervious  task. However,  if bank distress
contributes  significantly  to the downturn,  we should  see credit to the private sector  decline
along  with output. In fact, while the rate of growth of bank credit  falls below its pre-crisis  level- 8 -
beginning  in the crisis  year,  credit  as a share  of GDP remains  significantly  above  pre-crisis
levels for the entire  aftermath  period.  Thus, credit slows  down,  but less so than output.
Moreover,  in about half of the sample  credit growth  was still positive in t and t+1. On the other
hand,  in the second  and third  year following  the crisis,  when output growth  returns  to its pre-
crisis  levels,  credit  growth  remains  depressed. So the recovery  does not seem  to be driven  by a
resumption  in bank lending.
This evidence  casts doubts  about the credit  crunch  hypothesis,  according  to which  the
lack  of bank credit  significantly  contributes  to output decline  following  a banking  crisis,  and the
resumption  of bank lending  is a necessary  condition  for output recovery.  What seems  to be
happening,  instead,  is that, once  the macroeconomic  outlook  improves,  firms  are able  to
"economize"  on bank credit  by switching  to other  sources  of funding,  such as suppliers'  credit,
internal  financing,  foreign  credit  lines, equity,  or bonds. This interpretation  is in line  with what
as been  observed  during  the Mexican  recovery  following  the 1995  crisis  (Krueger  and Tomell,
1999).
Unfortunately,  this evidence,  though suggestive,  cannot  be conclusive  because  the
change  in the stock  of real credit  is an imperfect  measure  of the aggregate  amount  of funds.
available  to bank customers,  particularly  during a crisis. Some  of the increase  (or lack of
decline)  of credit  may  reflect the capitalization  of interest  payments  to avoid open  defaults  in a
situation  in which  interest  rates  have increased  dramatically. Also, in countries  with a sizable
portion  of foreign  currency  loans,  there may  be a revaluation  effect  due to a real exchange  rate
depreciation.  In Section  VI below we assess  the relevance  of this particular  source  of bias. Other
factors  may lead  to overestimate  the credit  contraction  following  a crisis: restructuring
operations  following  the crisis  may  result in an apparent  reduction  of aggregate  bank credit  to- 9 -
the private sector if some  loans  are transferred  to a special  institution  outside  the banking
system (for instance,  an asset management  company). Also, when loans  are set in nominal
terms, inflation  reduces  the value of real bank debt  outstanding. Since  inflation  is high
following  a banking  crisis,  as documented  below,  this valuation  effect  may be substantial.
E. Interest  rates
The first interest  rate in Table 1 is a "policy"  interest  rate, i.e. the rate on short-term
government  securities  where  available,  and a central  bank rate otherwise.  The real  rate is
obtained  by subtracting  inflation.  This interest  rate is higher in the year of the crisis  and in the
following  year, and lower  thereafter,  but these differences  are not significant  due  to large
standard  errors. Deposit  interest  rates also exhibit  no significant  difference  from  pre-crisis
levels,  so there is no evidence  that banks  have to pay higher  real rates  to attract  depositors.  This
reinforces  the view that depositor  safety  nets were strong. Interestingly,  both the real lending
interest  rate and the spread  rise significantly  in the crisis  year,  possibly reflecting  an increase  in
default  risk premiums.
F. Inflation,  the Exchange  Rate,  and the Government  Balance
Banking  crises  are accompanied  by a substantial  increase  in inflation  that peaks in the
year after the crisis  at almost  28 percentage  points above  the pre-crisis  level, and persists
throughout  the aftermath  period. The increase  in the rate of depreciation  of the exchange  rate is
even more marked  than  that of inflation,  even if only eight countries  in the sample  had a full- 10-
blown currency  crisis in the year  of the banking  crisis. 7 This loss of monetary  control,  however,
does  not seem to be driven by central  bank lending  to the banking  system,  as central  bank credit
does  not significantly  increase  as a share  of bank assets  in the sample  countries.  The latter
finding  is consistent  with the evidence  on deposits: if the banking  system  does not lose liquidity
through  depositor  runs,  then there should  be little need  for liquidity  support  from the monetary
authorities. 8 Finally,  there is no systematic  decline  in the government  surplus  in the aftermath
period,  despite  the large fiscal costs  of banking  crises  documented  in the literature  (Caprio  and
Kliengebiel,  1996).  This may  be because  the fiscal  impact  of the rescues  is spread  over a long
period of time, or because  other expenses  are cut or revenues  raised  to make room  for bank
bailout  costs. Another  plausible  hypothesis  is that bailout  costs are kept off budget. 9
III.  Correcting for Exchange Rate Valuation Effects
Since banking crises are often accompanied by a large exchange rate depreciation,
valuation effects may play an important role in shaping the movements of bank credit or bank
deposits in countries in which a sizable portion of these claims is denominated in foreign
currency.  Careful measurement of these valuation effects requires much country-specific
information that is not available in cross-country data bases and it is beyond the scope of this
7 The exchange rate depreciation also results in a sharp and persistent increase in bank foreign
liabilities  as a share  of assets,  of the order  of over 20 percentage  points.
8 The central bank may play an active role in providing liquidity to the system by injecting
liquidity in some banks and withdrawing it from others.
9 This is supported by the findings of Kharas and Mishra (2000), who find that, in recent years,
the main component of the large off-budget liabilities of developing countries is attributable to
realized  contingent  liabilities  following  financial  crises.paper. Nonetheless,  to get a better sense of the magnitude  of these  phenomena  for the sample
crises,  we have gathered  information  on the size of foreign  currency  deposits  and credit for the
episodes in our sample from central bank bulletins and other miscellaneous data sources.  The
search yielded foreign currency credit data for 20 episodes and foreign currency deposit data for
23 episodes. l°Using this information, we computed measures of aggregate real credit and
deposits "purged" of exchange rate valuation effects as follows: for the crisis year and the
aftermath years, total "corrected" real credit (deposits) is the sum of two terms, the domestic
currency  component  divided  by the domestic  price index, and the foreign  currency  component
multiplied by the real exchange rate prevailing in the year before the crisis, where the real
exchange rate is the nominal rate (vis-a-vis the US dollar) divided by the price index.  For the
years before the crisis the "corrected" measures are equal to the standard ones.  Thus, the
corrected variables measure the foreign currency component of total real credit and deposits as
if the real exchange rate had remained at its pre-crisis level.
The new variables were used to rerun the regressions for the rates of growth of real
credit and deposits and for the ratios of each variable to GDP.  The results are reported in Table
2.  Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient estimates and standard errors are not much different
whether  valuation  effects  are eliminated  or not, although  for some individual  countries  these
1°  The episodes for which both foreign currency credit and deposit data are available are:
Argentina (1995), Bolivia (1995), Chile (1980), Ecuador (1995), Finland (1991), Indonesia
(1992), India (1991), Israel (1983), Italy (1990), Japan (1992), Panama (1988), Papua New
Guinea (1989), Paraguay (1995), Peru (1993), Sweden (1990), United States (1981), Uruguay
(1981),Venezuela (1993).  In addition, information on deposits only is available for Thailand
(1983),  Nigeria (1991), Portugal (1986), El Salvador (1989), and Turkey (1991), and for credit
only for Mexico  (1982)  and Norway (1987).- 12-
effects  are not trivial. Both using the corrected  and non-corrected  measures,  credit  growth
declines  substantially  in the crisis  year, and remains  depressed  through  the third  year after the
crisis; credit,  however,  increases  as a share  of GDP as compared  to the pre-crisis  period.  This is
exactly  what was happening  for the baseline  sample. As for deposits,  the ratio of total deposits
to GDP  increases  in the aftermath  years  relative  to the pre-crisis  period even after  correcting  for
valuation  effects,  further  confirming  that depositor  runs  had limited  aggregate  impact.
IV. Differences  among  Groups  of Countries
To test whether  the crisis  response  differs across  countries  with different  characteristics,
we add to the regressions  an interaction  term between  each of the period dummies  and the
country  characteristic  of interest. A positive  and significant  sign for the interaction  term
indicates  that  the difference  between  the value of the variable  in the period  of interest  and the
pre-crisis  period is larger  for countries  with a high value of the characteristic.  Tables  2-5
summarize  the results. For brevity,  only the variables  for which at least  one of the interaction
terms has a significant  coefficient  are reported. Thus, for the variables  missing  from  the table
the response  to the crisis  does  not differ  based on the country  characteristic  in question.
The first characteristic  is the level of development  measured  by GDP-per-capita.  From
Table  3, it appears  that in more  developed  countries  the slowdown  in growth  and investment  is
more  persistent,  in contrast  with the commonly  voiced  view that developing  country  financial
crises  are more severe.'"  Credit  growth  decelerates  more markedly  in countries  with higher
" Gupta,  Mishra,  and Sahay  (2000) also find currency  crises  to be more recessionary  in more
developed  countries.- 13 -
GDP per capita,  but not quite as fast as GDP growth,  so bank credit as a share  of GDP  tends to
be higher relative  to the pre-crisis  period in those countries. Bank deposits  tend to fall at the
lower levels of development  but not at the higher,  suggesting  that the depositor  safety  net is not
as extensive  or effective  in poorer developing  countries. Interestingly,  a worse safety  net does
not lead to worse  output performance.  Government  finances seem to deteriorate  more the higher
is the level of development,  perhaps  because of the higher costs of the safety  net.
A second  issue is whether  the presence  of explicit deposit  insurance  makes any
difference  in the response  to crises, given that depositors  are often bailed  out in systemic  crises
even if they have no explicit  protection.' 2 Table  4 shows  that demand deposits  fall significantly
in countries  without  deposit  insurance,  suggesting  that deposit  insurance  does matter.  However,
total deposits  exhibit  the opposite  pattern,  indicating  that, when they are not insured,  depositors
shift to time deposits  or to foreign  currency  deposits. This result, however,  may  be driven  by
the revaluation  of foreign  currency  deposits  due to exchange  rate depreciation,  if this effect  is
stronger  in countries  without  deposit  insurance. Perhaps  because  total deposits  do not fall,  bank
credit-to-GDP  remains  above its pre-crisis  level also in countries  without  deposit  insurance.
Another  interesting  question  is whether  deposit insurance  makes crises less costly,  perhaps
because it makes the resolution  more orderly. If the cost of a crisis is measured  in terms of
output growth,  then the answer  id negative,  as output growth  remains below its pre-crisis  level
also in T+3 in deposit  insurance  countries.' 3
12 Demirgiuc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1999)  find that explicit  deposit insurance  makes banking
crisis more likely, suggesting  that a formal  guarantee  does play an important  role.
13 Of course,  we are not controlling  for the severity of the shocks  that cause the initial  output
decline.  In countries  without  deposit  insurance  output  may recover faster because  the initial
(continued...)- 14-
Next, we differentiate  among  crisis episodes  based  on whether banking  sector  problems
were accompanied  by a currency  crisis. 14 There are eight episodes  in which a currency  crisis
occurred  in the same year as the banking  crisis. Interestingly,  while it is these eight cases  that
cause  the increase  in the average  rate of exchange  rate depreciation  reported in Table 1,  the
output response  does not significantly  differ  between  the two groups  of countries  (Table  5).
This suggests - among other things -- that output recovery following a banking crisis is not just
the effect of an expansionary  real exchange  rate depreciation,  but is a more general
phenomenon.  There is no indication  that the real interest  rate behaved any different  in the two
groups  of countries,  but the bank lending  rate was lower  in currency  crisis countries  in T and
T+1, and so was the spread  in T and T+3.
Finally, the issue of what interest  rate policy should  be followed  during a financial  crisis
has attracted  much debate in the wake  of the Asian crises (Furman  and Stiglitz, 1999).  While  a
thorough empirical  investigation  of this controversy  is beyond the scope of this paper, we
examine  whether  the pattern  of response  to the banking  crisis  differed in countries  that
increased  the real interest  rate in the year of the crisis. In Table 6, a positive sign for the
interaction  term means  that the response  to the crisis of the particular  variable  was larger in
countries  that increased  interest  rates. The first observation  is that where interest  rates declined
central  banks stepped  up lending  to the banking  system  relative  to the pre-crisis  period. Thus,
shock was small, as without  deposit  insurance  even small shocks  could give rise to depositor
panics. However,  Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1999)  find that, for given  level of
macroeconomic  shocks,  countries  without  deposit  insurance  are less likely  to experience  crises.
14 The definition  of a currency  crisis follows  Milesi-Ferretti  and Razin (1998).  The occurrence
of "twin crises" has received  much attention  in the recent literature  (Kamninsky  and Reinhart,
1999, Goldfaijn  and Valdes,  1998).- 15  -
the more lax monetary stance  served  to support  the banking  system. Not surprisingly,  the
higher policy  interest rate was mirrored  by higher bank lending  rates and higher spreads,  and the
decline  in credit  growth was more  marked  in T+2 and T+3. Interestingly,  however,  output
growth  and investment  did not differ significantly  in the two group of countries. Finally,
countries  that increased  interest rates experienced  larger exchange  rate depreciation,  while
inflation  was not any different. Of course,  it is not clear on which  direction causality  goes,
because  countries  where there was more  pressure on the exchange  rate may have been forced to
increase  interest rates to keep  inflation  in check.
V. Evidence from Bank-Level Data
A. Data sources  and sample selection
To build a panel of bank-level  data, we use the 1999  and 2000 releases of the Bankscope
data base compiled  by Fitch IBCA. Countries  include  all OECD  countries  and several
developing  and transition  economies,  but the time series extends  back  only to 1991,  so all of the
crisis episodes  of the eighties  have to be excluded  from the sample.  To preserve sample size,  we
restrict  attention  to a five-year  period centered  around  the crisis year  rather than the seven-year
period used in the macro analysis. 1 5The resulting  sample  includes 16 banking  crises (listed in
Appendix  I) all occurring  in developing  countries  or transition economies.  Four of the crises
15  We include banks from Malaysia  though we have data only through  the first aftermath  year
(1998),  because coverage  for this country  is quite good and the Asian episodes  are of particular
interest.  Excluding  Malaysia  does  not significantly  alter the picture.- 16-
included  here  (Croatia,  Latvia,  Paraguay,  and  Costa  Rica) are not in the macro  sample  because
of lack  of data.
The Bankscope  database  is designed  to cover  the world's largest  banks and coverage  is
supposed  to reach 80-90  percent of bank assets in each country. For the countries  in our
sample,  Bankscope  covers 595 banks,  but this number  includes  banks that were created,  closed,
or merged  during  the sample  period,  or that simply  did not report  information  for one or more
years.  Thus,  the sample  of usable  banks is much  smaller,  consisting  of 257  banks.  Coverage  in
terms  of total bank assets,  though uneven  across  countries,  remains  quite good (see Table 3 in
Appendix  I for detailed  coverage  information).
A problem  with the Bankscope  data is that mergers  and acquisitions  that  do not lead  to a
name change  for the bank are not explicitly  identified  in the data  base. We were able  to find
specific  history  information  for 35 percent of the banks in the sample,  either  from Bankscope  or
from other sources.' 6 When  a merger or acquisition  was identified,  if we had information  for
both banks involved  we treated  them as one bank from the beginning  of the sample  period.
Otherwise,  the bank was dropped.  This reduced  the sample  size to 247.  The data set contains  a
number  of outliers,  some  of which were obvious  data  mistakes. Rather  than  eliminating
extreme  observation  in an arbitrary  way, observations  outside  a four standard  deviation  interval
around  the mean  were excluded  from each  regression.  We will point out when  the exclusion  of
outliers  significantly  changes  the results.  The exclusion  of outliers  should  also alleviate  the
impact  of unidentified  mergers  or acquisitions  on variables  such as credit  and deposits  growth.
16 For a large number  of banks Bankscope  history  information  only includes  the year of
establishment,  but it is not clear whether  this means  that the bank was not involved  in any
merger  or acquisition.- 17 -
Finally, in interpreting  the results is important  to keep in mind  that the sample  is affected
by survivorship  bias: banks that fail during  the sample  period  drop out,  so the sample  is biased
towards  the healthier  institutions.  To assess  the potential  extent  of this source  of bias, we have
looked  at what percentage  of banks in the Bankscope  database  stopped  reporting  data in the year
of the crisis  or in the two subsequent  years.  This figure,  which  provides  an upper  bound  to the
fraction  of banks  that closed  because  of the crisis, is 10.7  percent.
B. The variables  of interest
The information  from  Bankscope  allows us to examine  several  bank characteristics  in
the aftermath  of a banking  crisis. The first aspects  is performance,  measured  by gross  and net
return  on average  assets (see Appendix  II for details  on variable  definitions).  If the banking
crisis  is driven by a deterioration  in the quality  of the bank loan  portfolio,  we expect  to find a
decline  in profitability  as well  as an increase  in loan loss provisions  as the crisis  unfolds,  so we
also examine  the evolution  of loan loss provisions  and loan loss reserves.  Another  aspect  of
interest is bank efficiency,  which  is measured  here by the interest  margin  (the difference
between  interest  earned  and interest  paid) and by overhead  costs. The state of bank liquidity  is
captured  by cash (including  currency  and due from banks)  as a ratio of assets.  To examine
whether  depositor  panics  were an important  element  of the crises,  we look at the ratio of
deposits  to assets as well  as the rate  of growth  of real deposits.  Another  important  issue is
whether  bank distress  led to a fall in bank lending,  so we examine  the growth  rate of total assets
and of credit, and the breakdown  of bank assets between  loans and other  earning  assets.
Finally,  we look at the evolution  of equity  over assets  to determine  whether  crises  were
accompanied  by an erosion  of bank capital.- 18-
C. Estimation  results
To characterize  bank behavior  in the aftermath  of a crisis  we employ  the same
methodology  used  for the macro  variables,  except  that, as explained  in the preceding  section,
the period  covered  is limited  to five years.  Thus, for each  variable  of interest  we run a
regression  on a panel consisting  of five observations  for each bank in the sample; the
independent  variables  are country  dummies  and  three period dummies,  one for the crisis  year
and one for each of the two years  following  the crisis. The coefficient  of each  time dummy  is
the mean difference  between  the value  of the variable  in the year  and the country-specific
average  of the value of the variable  in the two pre-crisis  years.
Table 7 contains  the regression  results.  Returns  on average  assets and profits  are below
the pre-crisis  level in the year of the crisis,  and more  markedly  so in the first post-crisis  year,
while in T+2 the difference  is no longer  significant.  Non-performing  loans and loan  loss
reserves  rise substantially  beginning  in the crisis  year, while  by T+2 they are back  to their pre-
crisis level,  probably  because  at that stage  banks begin getting  bad assets off their books.  Thus,
the banking  crises  were accompanied  by a decline  in bank profitability  and asset quality.' 7
The crisis  is also followed  by a significant  decline  in liquidity  and by a reduction  in both
operating  costs and  the interest  margin.  Thus, financial  difficulties  seem  to provide  a stimulus
for banks to improve  efficiency.
Turning  now  to bank deposits,  the rate of growth  of real deposits  is significantly  below
that of the pre-crisis  period  in the first year after  the crisis.  However,  because growth  rates were
17 If outliers  are included  in the sample  the loan loss variables  lose significance.-19-
high before the crisis, deposits were still increasing in absolute terms in 57 percent of the
sample banks. 18 In fact, the sample banks lost other sources of funding (such as interbank credit,
foreign loans, commercial paper, or equity) more rapidly than deposits, as witnessed by the
significant increase in the ratio of deposits to assets. These results are probably affected by
survivorship bias, since healthier banks may have attracted deposits from weaker banks or from
weak non-bank institutions.  Nonetheless, because the banks in the sample represent a sizable
portion of the banking system, this evidence supports the view that extensive runs did not take
place despite signs of deteriorating bank profitability and asset quality. The shift towards
deposit financing may be a consequence of the introduction or extension of depositor guarantees
by the government in the midst of a crisis, since such guarantees make deposits a cheaper and
more stable source of funding.
On the asset side, the rate of growth of total assets (in real terms) is not significantly
different from its pre-crisis level in T and T+l,  while in T+2 it is above that level.  In contrast,
real credit slows down substantially beginning in the crisis year, with the growth rate declining
by nine percentage points in both T and T+1. As in the case of deposits, because of the high
rates of growth before the crisis, in both periods real credit was still growing in absolute terms
in a majority of the sample banks. Also, by T+2 credit growth recovered strongly, so, in contrast
with the evidence from the macro data, the credit contraction here seems to be short-lived.
Differences in sample or survivorship bias may account for this differences;  also, if credit
growth reflects mostly growth in interbank market, it would not be captured in the macro data,
18 If outliers are included deposit growth is not significantly different from the pre-crisis period.- 20 -
where  interbank  flows are netted out. Finally, the averages  examined  here are not weighted  by
the size of the bank,  so they do not tell much about aggregate  behavior.
Another  interesting  regularity  is that banks reallocated  funds  away  from lending,  as
witnessed  by the significant  decline  in the loan-to-asset  ratio in T and T+1 and  by the increase
in the ratio of other earning assets to total assets in T+1, a phenomenon  also identified  by case
studies.1 9 There  are a number of explanations  for this behavior: the portfolio  shift may be due
to a contraction  in loan demand  which, in turn, may be caused  by higher lending  interest  rates or
by the adverse  shocks  that accompany  the crisis. Another  possibility  is that banks are forced  to
cut collateral-based  lending because  lower asset prices  reduce  the value of collateral  (Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997). In times of stress banks may also shift to safer assets to economize  on
regulatory  capital (the "capital crunch"). A fourth  possibility  is that  the shift reflects  rescue
operations  in which  banks exchange  non-performing  loans  for government  securities,  as in
Mexico  in 1995. Notice  that the shift to other earning  assets occurs  even  though our sample  is
potentially  biased towards the less distressed  banks,  which should  be those  with a healthier
customer  base and fewer  non-performing  assets.  Whatever  the explanation,  this evidence
suggests  that preserving  banks' access  to deposits  and other  sources  of futuding  during  a crisis
may not be sufficient  to preserve  the flow of credit,  as banks tend to redirect  funds away from
19  Luzio-Antezana  (1999) finds that the positive  net inflows  of deposits  into Mexican  banks
beginning  in the second quarter  of 1996  were used to purchase  of govermment  securities  (as well
as to increase  provisioning).  Catao (1997)  documents  that Argentine  banks increased  their
investment  in government  securities  after the 1995 crisis  over and above what was mandated  by
increased  liquidity  requirements.  Domac  and Ferri (1999)  present evidence  suggesting  a similar
phenomenon  in Korea,  Malaysia, and  the Philippines  in 1998.  In Thailand,  large banks
benefiting  from deposit flight from small banks in the immediate  aftermath  of the crisis
increased  their liquidity  instead of expanding  their loan  portfolio  (Ito and Pereira  da Silva,
1999).- 21 -
lending. The reduction  in bank lending activity  may also help explain  the reduction  in overhead
costs.
2 0
D. Differences  among  banks
The results  described  so far reflect the average  behavior  of banks,  and it is natural  to ask
at this stage whether  the effects  of the crisis  were rather uniform across  the banking  sector, or
significant  differences  existed.  To answer  this question,  we have re-estimated  the regressions  of
the preceding  section  dividing  the sample banks in five subsamnples  based on their profitability
in the year  of the crisis. Accordingly,  the first subsample  includes  banks that, in each country,
belonged  to the lowest quintile  of the distribution  of the return on assets,  and similarly  for the
other  subsamples.  The results are summarized  in Table 8. For brevity, the table reports  only the
signs and significance  levels of the coefficients.
The first observation  is that the negative  effects  of the crisis  on profitability  is
concentrated  in the bottom two quintiles  of banks,  which also experience  a marked  increase  in
loan loss reserves  and provisions  in T and T+1 and a decline  in equity  over assets.  Interestingly,
deposits  become  a more important  source  of funding  for these institutions,  while  there is some
evidence  that loans  tend to decline  relative  to assets while other earning  assets become  more
important.  Most strikingly,  in the lowest quintile  of banks both credit and deposits  decelerate
substantially  both in T and T+l. The decline  in the rate of growth  of these variables  are of the
order  of 15-20  percentage  points, so they are quite substantial.  Thus, while on average  there is
20 The portfolio  shift away  from lending is more marked in countries  with deposit  insurance,
and so is the decline  in overhead  costs.-22 -
no evidence  of a strong  decline  in deposit  growth,  the weakest  banks in each  country  do
experience  a severe  decline,  which  is also accompanied  by a drastic  slowdown  in credit  growth.
Other  trends  do not appear  to be concentrated  among  the weakest  banks: for instance,
the decline  in overhead  costs is shared  by all the banks, suggesting  that financial  difficulties
lead to improvements  in cost efficiency  across  the board. Also, the shift from  loans  to other
earning  assets  takes  place  also on the top and middle  quintile  of banks,  suggesting  that it is not
just the effect  of recapitalization  operations  in rescued  banks. Finally,  the decline  in cash
appears  to be more  marked  among  the stronger  institutions.
V.  Concluding Remarks
Perhaps  the most interesting  empirical  regularity  uncovered  in this study is that
contemporary  banking  crises  are not accompanied  by substantial  declines  in bank deposits.
Thus, while  depositor  runs  have played  a central  role in the theoretical  literature  on banking
crises,  in practice  they seem  to be a sideshow  at best. Furthermore,  while bank  lending  interest
rates  and spreads  rise in the wake  of a crisis,  we find no evidence  of increased  deposit  interest
rates. A plausible  interpretation  of these findings  is that bank safety  nets have  succeeded  in
keeping depositors  from fleeing  despite  widespread  insolvency  in the banking  system. Of
course,  to the extent  that depositor  runs also  help maintaining  appropriate  incentives  for
bankers,  the lack of runs may  be seen as a lack of discipline.
Sharp  declines  in liquidity  due to depositor  runs,  forcing  banks to cut lending  even  to
creditworthy  borrowers,  have  been often  viewed  as an important  mechanism  through  which- 23 -
bank distress affects the real economy and helps propagating adverse shocks.2' Contemporary
banking crises do not seem to be followed by prolonged recessions:  the slowdown in output
growth is usually sharp but short-lived, with growth rates back to their pre-crisis levels in the
second year after the crisis. This evidence raises the question of whether the quick rebound in
output is the result of the lack of widespread depositor panics. Our analysis cannot give a
definite answer to this complex question. Nonetheless, some of the evidence discussed in the
paper points in a different direction: in our sample, credit growth remains below its pre-crisis
level even after output growth has rebounded, suggesting that the recovery may not result from
a resumption in bank lending. At the same time, even banks in the best financial position, who
do not see significant declines in profitability or capital, decrease their loan-to-asset ratio
following a crisis.
These two findings suggest that during a banking crisis protecting deposits may not be
sufficient to protect bank credit, as lack of usable collateral and poor borrower creditworthiness
discourage banks from lending.  However, protecting bank credit may not be a priority in the
immediate aftermath of a crisis, as the real economy can rebound without it, at least while there
is substantial unutilized capacity. 22
21 Mishkin (1996) views panics as an important mechanism through which banking crises
propagate to the real sector.
22 For a discussion of policies followed to support credit in the recent Asian crisis, see Lindgren
etal.  (1999).- 24 -
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Table 1. Crisis  Aftermath  -Evidence from Aggregate  Data
T  T+l  T+2  T+3
GDP Growth  -3.913***  -3.519***  -.950  .398
(1.004)  (.896)  (.662)  (.829)
Credit Growth  -6.761***  -7.390***  -7.178***  -5.687**
(2.261)  (2.311)  (2.199)  (2.334)
Credit/GDP  6.046***  7.849***  6.748***  5.646**
(1.705)  (2.675)  (2.062)  (2.180)
Investment/GDP  -.428  -1.067**  -.724  -.854
(.551)  (.564)  (.621)  (.698)
Demand deposit growth  -5.798***  -2.397  -3.676  -4.280
(2.0192)  (1.7612)  (2.814)  (2.608)
Demand deposits/GDP  .286  .333  .734  .878*
(.336)  (.398)  (.466)  (.509)
Total deposits/GDP  2.920**  5.554***  5.177***  4.233***
(1.382)  (1.881)  (1.292)  (1.451)
Real interest rate  5.501  6.918  -7.239  -3.078
(6.768)  (11.525)  (8.279)  (4.548)
Real lending rate  10.504**  21.312  16.249  3.827
(4.685)  (17.007)  (10.043)  (5.685)
Real deposit rate  1.806  .827  -3.291  -4.903
(2.036)  (3.359)  (3.686)  (4.023)
Spread  10.079**  22.332  21.016  10.906**
(4.899)  (15.696)  (13.483)  (4.899)
Inflation  19.166**  27.785**  23.820**  18.177***
(6.816)  (13.408)  (10.449)  (5.830)
Depreciation  28.714***  36.968**  30.384***  23.232***
(8.274)  (14.415)  (11.121)  (6.707)
Fiscal surplus/GDP  -.494  -.803  -.041  .974
(.594)  (.512)  (.713)  (1.015)
Central bank funds/bank  .844  1.233  1.410  2.071
assets  (1.565)  (.999)  (1.610)  (2.368)
*, **and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are given in parenthesis.- 27 -
Table 2. Real Credit  and Deposit  Corrected  for Exchange  Rate Effects
T  T+l  T+2  T+3
Real Credit Growth  -7.971**  -9.430**  -13.532***  -14.931***
(3.961)  (3.872)  (.3.961)  (3.960)
Corrected Real Credit  -8.031**  -12.887***  -14.075***  -14.753***
Growth  (3.759)  (3.675)  (3.675)  (3.759)
CreditlGDP  4.117***  4.677***  3.791**  1.584
(1.651)  (1.588)  (1.589)  (1.824)
Corrected Credit/GDP  4.122**  4.780***  4.093**  2.109
(1.725)  (1.659)  (1.659)  (1.907)
Real deposit growth  -8.930  -4.885  -12.121  -12.201
(8.071)  (8.030)  (8.030)  (8.356)
Corrected real deposits  -11.076  -7.700  -11.488  -12.305
growth  (7.977)  (7.937)  (7.937)  (8.260)
Deposits/GDP  4.117***  4.677***  3.791**  1.584
(1.651)  (1.588)  (1.588)  (1.824)
Corrected deposits/GDP  4.123**  4.780***  4.093**  2.109
(1.725)  (1.659)  (1.659)  (1.907)
,  *and  *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and I percent respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are given in parenthesis.TABLE  3
DIFFERENCE  AMONG  COUNTRIES  BASED  ON  LEVEL  OF  DEVELOPMENT
T  T*DEV  T+l  T+lxDEV  T+2  T+2xDEV  T+3  T+3xDEV
Growth  -3.913**  0.000  -2.461**  -0.191  0.285  -0.229***  2.065*  -0.220**
(1.225)  (0.083)  (1.171)  (0.108)  (0.829)  (0.055)  (1.149)  (0.085)
Investment  -0.389  -0.048  -0.792  -0.131  -0.027  -0.279***  -0.044  -0.362***
(0.713)  (0.079)  (0.739)  (0.085)  (0.767)  (0.089)  (0.881)  (0.073)
Growth  of real
bank  credit  -4.583  -0.358  -3.939  -0.802***  -4.100**  -0.876***  1.233  -1.376***
(2.908)  (0.218)  (2.883)  (0.204)  (2.907)  (0.243)  (2.760)  (0.255)
Bank  credit/GDP  0.893  0.338**  2.890  0.276*  1.325  0.288**  -1.178  0.285
(1.079)  (0.127)  (1.951)  (0.145)  (1.217)  (0.134)  (1.564)  (0.177)
Demand
deposits/GDP  -0.935***0.369**  -1.111***0.455***  -0.777**  0.476***  -0.951***0.549***
(0.245)  (0.103)  (0.275)  (0.109)  (0.346)  (0.124)  (0.325)  (0.112)
Fiscal
surplus/GDP  0.162  -0.113  0.366  -0.218**  1.419  -0.288**  3.181***  -0.454***
0.712)  (0.077)  (0.592)  (0.088)  (0.810)  (0.103)  (0.978)  (0.169)
*  and *  indicate significant levels of 10,5, and I percent respectively.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are given in parenthesis.Table 4.  Differences between Countries with and without Deposit Insurance
T  TxDI  T+l  T+lxDI  T+2  T+2xDI  T+3  T+3xDI
Growth  -3.533**  -1.031  -2.988**  -1.459  -.567  -1.061  1.771  -3.872**
(1.498)  (1.760)  (1.239)  (1.693)  (.910)  (1.213)  (1.043)  (1.552)
Bank credit/GDP  7.039**  -2.745  9.773**  -5.206  8.479**  -4.619  7.79  1**  -5.989*
(2.514)  (2.8X7)  (4.022)  (4.283)  (3.091)  (3.306)  (3.105)  (3.525)
Demand deposits!  -.526**  2.152**  -.887***  3.284***  -.262  2.683**  -.526**  3.293***
GDP  (.214)  (.764)  (.218)  (.912)  (.333)  (1.090)  (.269)  (1.263)
Total deposits/GDP  4.286**  -3.634**  7.885**  -6.275**  7.059*** -5.066** 5.741**  -4.134**
(1.818)  (1.806)  (2.891)  (2.936)  (1.911)  (2.091)  (2.066)  (2.502)
*  and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1  percent respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are given in parentheses.Table 5
DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  COUNTRIES  WITH  AND  WITHOUT  A CURRENCY  CRISIS
T  TXCC  T+1  T+IxCC  T+2  T+2xCC  T+3  T+3xCC
Depreciation  -7.362**49.017***  11.457  15.382  10.874 -7.953  2.262  -2.138
(3.718) (14.221)  (9.923) (15.116)  (7.070) (8.858)  (9.134) (11.095)
Investment/GDP  -0.329  -0.329  -1.659**3.057**  -1.089  1.883  -1.293  2.540
(0.636) (1.174)  (0.620) (1.264)  (0.733) (1.141)  (0.727) (2.112)
Real lending  13.161**-14.632**  28.642  -34.272***  19.771 -18.559  3.592  -2.419
rates  (5.421) (6.607)  (21.368)(7.026)  (12.490)(12.853)  (6.706) (7.253)
Spread  11.813**-12.734*  25.881  -22.863  24.883  -22.453  11.913**-9.641*
(5.547) (5.750)  (18.727)(18.853)  (16.453)(16.495)  (5.405) (5.544)
Total deposit]  3.180**  -1.028  6.964** -5.481**  5.431***-0.986  4.507**  -1.050
GDP  (1.523) (1.734)  (2.464) (2.713)  (1.517) (2.876)  (1.875) (2.183)
*,**, and *** indicate *, *significant levels of  10,5, and I percent respectively.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard  errors  are given in parentheses.TABLE 6
COUNTRIES THAT INCREASED  THEIR INTEREST RATES  DURING  CRISES VS. THOSE THAT  DID NOT
T  TXINT  T+1  T+IxINT  T+2  T+2xINT  T+3  T+3xINT
Growth  of real bank  -8.070**  1.264  -2.620  1.264  -5.027**  -3.757  .081  -9.164**
credit  (3.340)  (4.589)  (2.167)  (4.047)  (2.625)  (4.191)  (3.105)  (4.390)
Bank credit/GDP  1.562  2.234  .995  3.684  .848  3.439  -2.326  6.969**
(1.365)  (1.738)  (1.557)  (2.039)  (1.867)  (2.167)  (2.110)  (2.771)
Total deposits/GDP  5.098***  10.824***  -1.101  10.824**  2.124  5.007*  .674  5.371*
(1.047)  (2.213)  (1.221)  (3.444)  (1.809)  (2.652)  (1.602)  (2.869)
Real interest  rate  -9.163**  27.487**  -11.487**  33.244  -11.303  6.819  -8.898**  9.500
(4.125)  (11.411)  (4.605)  (20.310)  (9.998)  (16.186)  (4.605)  (8.606)
Real lending  rates  -.868  18.072**  -4.366  42.384  1.573  24.680  -3.789  11.972
(1.579)  (7.985)  (2.976)  (29.778)  (1.789)  (17.416)  (3.710)  (10.656)
Spread  .995  16.568**  1.152  38.307  1.620**  34.468  1.534  16.780**
(.848)  (8.125)  (.810)  (26.942)  (.719)  (23.160)  (.887)  (7.907)
Depreciation  -2.890  17.378*  -3.102  33.231**  -5.389  17.550**  -4.810  8.918
(6.720)  (10.666)  (5.771)  (14.673)  (5.339)  (9.366)  (6.493)  (14.816)
Fiscal  surplus/GDP  .856  -2.406**  1.411**  -3.431***  1.781  -2.710*  3.901***  5.371*
(.660)  (1.165)  (.628)  (.952)  (1.026)  (1.469)  (1.062)  (2.869)
Central bank funds/bank  .579  1.319  2.866**  -4.398**  2.469**  -7.018***  2.822**  -9.227***
assets  (1.106)  (2.259)  (1.274)  (1.824)  (.946)  (1.703)  (1.222)  (1.956)
*, **and  *** indicate  significance  levels  of 10,  5, and I percent  respectively. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors are given
in parentheses.TABLE  7
Crisis Aftermath  -Evidence  from  Bank  Level Data
T  T+1  T+2
Retum on average  asset  -0.0054**  -0.0072***  -0.0019
(0.0025)  (0.0022)  (0.0025)
Profitability  -0.0062**  -0.0077***  -0.0013
(0.0027)  (0.0025)  (0.0024)
Interest  margin  0.0006  -0.0076***  -0.0102***
(0.0034)  (0.0030)  (0.0031)
Overhead  -0.0010  -0.0052***  -0.0105***
(0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0019)
Loan loss provisions  0.0157***  0.0115***  -0.0036
(0.0050)  (0.0041)  (0.0039)
Loan loss reserves  0.02117***  0.0259***  0.0049
(0.0085)  (0.0093)  0.0100
Cash/assets  -0.0026  -0.0076***  -0.0075***
(0.0028)  (0.0026)  (0.0027)
Deposits/assets  0.0144*  0.0161*  0.0228***
(0.0081)  (0.0086)  (0.0082)
Equity/assets  -0.0047  -0.0062  -0.01  12**
(0.0050)  (0.0054)  (0.0050)
Loan/assets  -0.0247**  -0.0390***  -0.0121
(0.0103)  (0.0106)  (0.0113)
Other earning  0.0167  0.0359***  0.0196*
assets/assets  (0.0108)  (0.0111)  (0.0119)
Growth  of real assets  0.0273  -0.0054  0.0859***
(0.0258)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)
Growth  of real loans  -0.1061***  -0.0759**  0.1107***
(0.0311)  (0.0331)  (0.0352)
Growth  of real deposits  -0.0404  -0.0651**  0.0090
(0.0320)  (0.0335)  (0.0319)
*, **and  *** indicate significance  levels of 10,  5, and 1 percent  respectively.  White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent  standard  errors  are given  in parenthesis.TABLE  7
Crisis Aftermath -Differences Among Banks Based on Return on Assets in the Crisis Year
First quintile  Second quintile  Third quintile  Fourth quintie  Fifth quintile
T  T+l  T+2  T  T+l  T+2  T  T+  T+2  T  T+1  T+2  T  T+l  T+2
ROAA  +***  _  ++*
Profitability  +***  ***  -




Loan Loss  +***  +**+*  +*
Provisions
Loan Loss  +  +*** 
Reserves
Cash/Assets  - -
Deposits/  +*  +**  +  +*  +*  +  +
Assets
Equity/ ..L 
Assets  _  _  _  _-  __
Assets__  __  _
OEA/  +*  ++| 
Assets
Asseot t  +***  ++*  ,  +***
Growth  __  _  __  _  ___  _  _  _  _  _
Credit  +*  +*  +  :  +***
Growth  _
Deposit  +  ***  +  +
Growth  **and  _  _  *scfIt
"and~j  indicate  significance  levels  of 10, 5, nd1 percent  respectively.Appendix I
Data Sources and Definitions
Table Al.  Definitions  and Data Sources  for Macro  Variable 3
Variable  Name  Definition  Source
Growth  Rate of growth  of real GDP  IFS where available.  Otherwise,  WEO.
Investment!GDP  Ratio of investment  to GDP  IFS
Real credit  growth  Rate of growth  of credit  by  Credit:  IFS. GDP  deflator:  IFS or WEO.
deposit  money  banks deflated
by the GDP  deflator
Demand  deposit  growth  Rate of growth  of demand  Demand  deposits: IFS. GDP  deflator: IFS or
deposits  in deposit  money  WEO.
banks,  deflated  by GDP
deflator
Total deposits/GDP  Ratio  of total deposit  in  Total deposits: IFS.  GDP:  IFS or WEO.
deposit  money  banks  to GDP
Real interest  rate  Nominal  interest  rate  minus  IFS. Where  available,  nominal  rate  on short-
the contemporaneous  rate of  term government  securities.  Otherwise,  a rate
inflation  charged  by the Central  Bank  to domestic  banks
such as the discount  rate.
Real lending  rate  Bank average  lending  interest  Lending  rate: IFS. GDP  deflator: IFS or
rate minus rate of change  of  WEO.
GDP  deflator
Real  deposit  rate  Bank average  deposit  interest  Deposit  rate: IFS. GDP  deflator: IFS or WEO.
rate minus  rate of change  of
GDP deflator
Spread  Lending  rate minus  deposit
rate
Inflation  Rate of change  of the GDP  IFS or WEO.
deflator
Depreciation  Rate of change  of the nominal  IFS
exchange  rate (period  average)
Fiscal  surplus/GDP  Government  surpluse  divided  Deficit:  IFS. GDP: IFS or WEO.
by GDP
Central  bank funds/bank  assets  Loans from  the monetary  IFS
authorities  to deposit  money
banks divided  by total  assets
of deposit  money  banks.
The macroeconomic  variables  are available  for the following  sample  of banking  crises:
Argentina  (1995),  Bolivia (1995),  Colombia  (1982),  Chile (1980),  Ecuador  (1995),  El Salvador
(1989),  Finland  (1991),  Guyana  (1993),  Indonesia  (1992),  India (1991),  Israel (1983),  Italy
(1990),  Jordan  (1989),  Japan (1992),  Kenya (1993),  Mali (1987),  Malaysia  (1985),  Mexico
23 IFS stands  for International  Financial  Statistics,  published  by the IMF. WEO  stands  for the
World  Economic  Outlook  database  of the IMF.- 35 -
(1982, 1994), Nigeria (1991), Norway (1987), Nepal (1988), Panama (1988), Papua New
Guinea (1989), Paraguay (1995), Peru (1993), Philippines (1981), Portugal (1986), Sri Lanka
(1989), South Africa (1985), Sweden (l990),Thailand  (1983), Turkey (1991), United States
(1981), Uruguay (1981),Venezuela (1993).
B. Bank Level Data
All bank level data come from the 1999  release of the Bankscope  database,  compiled  by Fitch
IBCA.
Table A2. Variable  Definitions
Variable  Name  Definition
ROAA  Ratio  of after tax profits  to total assets.
Profitability  Ratio  of gross  profit to total assets.
Interest  Margin  Ratio  of net interest  income  (interest  income
-interest expenditure)  to total assets.
Overhead/Assets  Ratio  of overhead  expenses  (personnel  expenses  and
other  non interest  expenses)  to total assets
Loan  Loss  Provisions  Ratio  of loan loss  provisions  to total  assets.
Loan Loss  Reserves  Ratio  of loan loss  reserves  to total  assets.
Cash/Assets  Ratio  of cash  and dues  from banks  to total assets
Deposits/Assets  Ratio  of total  deposits  (demand  deposits,  saving
deposits,  time deposits,  interbank  deposits  and
other  deposits)  to assets
Equity/Assets  Ratio  of equity  to assets
Loan/Assets  Ratio  of loans (commercial  loans,  public  sector
loans,  consumer  loans,  secured  loans  and other
loans,  net of LLR)  to total  assets
OEA/Assets  Ratio  of other  earning  assets  (deposit  with  banks,
Government  securities,  other  investments  and
equity  investments)  to total assets.
Asset Growth  Growth  rate of real total  assets,  real assets
Calculated  using  CPI data  from the IFS.
Credit Growth  Growth  rate of total real credit,  real credit
Calculated  using  CPI data from  the IFS.
Deposit  Growth
Growth  rate of total  real deposits,  real deposits
Calculated  using  the data  from the IFS.- 36 -
The sample contains the following crisis episodes:  Argentina (1995), Bolivia (1995),
Costa Rica (1994), Croatia (1995), Ecuador (1995), Kenya (1995), Korea (1997), Latvia (1995),
Malaysia (1985), Mexico (1994), Paraguay (1995), Swaziland (1995), Thailand (1997), Turkey
(1994), Venezuela (1993) Zambia (1994).
Table A3. Sample  Coverage
Country  Total number of  Number of banks  Fraction of banks  Fraction of assets
banks  included  covered (in  (or loans or
In the sample  percentage)  deposits) covered (in
percentage)*
Argentina  130  43  33  66
Bolivia  16  13  81  NA
Costa  Rica  28  11  39  72
Croatia  60  19  32  71
Ecuador  41  21  51  80
Kenya  53  7  13  46
Korea  18  18  100  100
Latvia  33  8  32  53
Malaysia  35  25  71  73
Mexico  27  10  37  57
Paraguay  32  8  25  NA
Swaziland  4  2  50  56
Thailand  15  13  87  NA
Turkey  55  34  62  85
Venezuela  30  10  33  60
Zambia  18  5  28  64
*The denominator is total unconsolidated assets (or loans or deposits) of the banking system  in the last year in the
sample (which varies depending on the year of the crisis).  Because these figures are from miscellaneous country
sources, the defnition  of the banking system may change from country to country.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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